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The FOMC in 1990: Onset of
Recession
HE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1990 marked
the end of a long expansion of the U.S. economy,
extending almost continuously from the final
quarter of 1982. In November) industrial pro-
duction plummeted at an annual rate of 19.8
percent, and civilian employment fell by nearly
450,000. The most recent estimate of i-cal gross
national product (GNP) indicates that it fell at an
annual rate of 1.6 percent in the fourth quarter,
and the unemployment rate climbed from 5.3
percent in June to 6.1 percent by the end of
the year. By all accounts, recession had arrived.~
Because the U.S. economy entered the reces-
sion in the latter portion of the year, calendar
1990 is an interesting period in which to sum-
marize the actions of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC).2 By considering FOMC direc-
tives chronologically, this paper will develop a
case study of monetary policymaking during the
onset of a recession. Within the context of the
chronology, emphasis will be placed on two
types of uncertainty faced by the Committee.
First, there is uncertainty about the immediate
past, current and future path of real output, a
primary measure of economic activity. Second,
‘According to the Federal Reserve Board’s ygg~ Monetary
Policy Objectives (p. 3), “The [U.S.I economy ... fell into
recession in the latter part of 1990, and ...that recession
has clearly continued into the early part of 1991.” The Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which
makes official decisions on dating business cycle peaks
and troughs, recently announced that the expansion peak-
ed in July 1990.
there is uncertainty about the thrust of monetary
policy at a point in time, because of the various
ways the policy stance can be measured. While
many other considerations enter into FOMC
policymaking, as will be shown, these two fac-
tors loom large in the Committee’s attempts to
react swiftly and effectively to economic events.
The next section provides the background for
understanding Committee decision-making in
1990. It introduces the FOMC’s stated objectives
and illustrates briefly how the Committee might
hope to bring them into balance. This back-
ground is crucial to an understanding of the
bulk of the paper) the chronology of FOMC
decision-making contained in the subsequent
section. The final portion of the paper provides
summary comments.
A FRAMEWORK F’OR ANALYZING
FOMC POLICY ACTIONS
No analysis of FOMC actions can take place
until some context for the decision-making is
provided.a To make sense of the subsequent
chronology, it is essential to understand what
2See the shaded insert, ‘The Organization of the FOMC,”
for a description of the Committee.
3The terms “decision-making” and “policy actions” are
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the Committee is trying to do and how it might
hope to achieve its desires. i’hese are matters of
controversy in macroeconomics, and the con-
troversy will not be resolved in this article. In-
stead, the following framework for understand-
ing FOMC decision-making relies primarily on
official Committee statements and simple em-
pirical illustrations.~Potential interpretations or
conclusions are left to the reader.
FOMC Monetary Policy Objectives
The FOMC stated its goals for monetary policy
in each of the eight directives it issued in 1990.
Specifically, the objectives of the Committee
were to foster progress toward price stability
and to promote sustained real output growth.~
Implementation of these objectives was general-
ly achieved by Committee-ordered intervention
in the market for reserves or, in Committee
parlance, by altering the “. .-degree of
pressure on reserve positions.”°
Committee members sometimes reconcile the
two policy objectives by viewing price stability
as a long-run goal and, correspondingly, sustain-
ed real output growth as a short-run goal. For
instance, one summary of a Committee discus-
sion cites some members arguing that “an eas-
ing of short-run policy if such were needed to
help avert a cumulative deterioration in econom-
ic activity ..-would not be inconsistent with
the Committee’s long-term commitment to price
stability.”~Similarly) references are sometimes
made to “the Comniittee’s long-run, anti-inflation
strategy.”8 The next section illustrates, via a sim-
ple empirical exercise, one sense in which price
stability is a long-run goal.
4The official summary of Committee deliberations is con-
tained in the “Record of Policy Actions of the Federal
Open Market Committee” for each meeting, released to
the press shortly after the subsequent regular meeting and
later published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin and the
Board’s Annual Report. References to “the Record” and
to press releases in this article refer to this document.
5The following sentence appears in every 1990 directive:
“The IFOMCI seeks monetary and financial conditions that
will foster price stability, promote growth in output on a
sustainable basis, and contribute to an improved pattern of
international transactions.” The third obiective, more am-
biguous than the first two, also plays a role in the analysis
to follow.
~Thisterminology appears in every FOMC directive in 1990.
The market for reserves is discussed in more detail below.
7March Press Release, pp. 12-13.
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Controlling Inflation
The FOMC’s objective of controlling inflation
arises out of a generally accepted proposition
that
the Committee has considerable influence
over the long-run rate of price level change. For
instance, at the February 1990 meeting “the
E Committee recognized that over time ---slower M2 growth would be compatible with price
stability Since all Committee decision-
making needs to be understood with this prop-
osition in mind, some evidence on long-run
inflation will be considered here.b0
Following Lucas (1980), consider a version of
the quantity theory of money with the key im-
plication stated as follows: over the long term,
an increase in the quantity of money, appro-
priately defined, is reflected in an equal and
proportionate increase in the price level.” The
proposition can be investigated in an atheoretical
L
way, since there is a wealth of available interna-
tional cross-section evidence. The evidence pre-
sented below constitutes an updated version of
that marshaled by Vogel (1974) and analyzed in
Lucas (1987, 1980) and Dwyer and Hafer (1988).
Figure 1 provides a plot of 20-year averages
of growth rates of M2 and the associated 20- r year averages of annual changes in the con-
sumer price index for 23 OECIJ countries) 11
Latin American countries and Mexico.’2 The
period covered is 1970 to 1989; each country is
a single observation in the figure. The quantity
theory predicts that the observations will lie on
a 45°line, that is, that changes in money stocks
F and price levels will be proportional. The 45°
line in the diagram is adjusted to pass through
the mean of the data, but it has a slope of posi-
tive
one. It is not a regression line; no attempt
has been made to fit the line to the data. The




l2The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, (West) Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States,
Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Guyana, Suriname, Paraguay,
Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Uruguay.
Some observations were missing: Brazil, 1985-1989; Col-
umbia, 1986 and 1989; Chile, 1985-1989; Guyana,
Suriname, Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, 1989.
“For a discussion of the quantity theory and its variants,
see Laidler (1985).
33
Average annual CR1 inflation
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Figure 1
The Quantity Theory and
International Evidence 1970-1989
0
provides some evidence of the validity of the
quantity theory.”
Lucas (1987) was happy enough with this type
of evidence to pronounce the inflation problem
“successfully solved in a scientific sense.”4 The
figure does seem to reflect what many econo-
mists and market participants have in mind
when they think about the relationship between
central bank actions and inflation. The theory
appears to work surprisingly well, as the figure
contains information derived from countries
°MarchPress Release, p. 12. Where data are missing, averages are over available
lOSee also the work on money and inflation in the P’ model, years. M2 is used because the FOMC sets target ranges
such as Hallman, Porter and Small (1989). for this aggregate and because information on this ag-
gregate is collected for all countries in the sample. 13One possible objection to this evidence is that the relation-
ships between monetary growth and inflation have chang-
ed in the 1980s. However, the plots of recalculated
averages using only 1980s data tell, by and large, the
same story as figure 1. See also Dwyer and Hafer (1988).
Recalculating the averages using Ml also does not alter
the general conclusion.
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with very different social and economic struc-
tures. Most importantly for the purposes of
analyzing FOMC decisions, the figure provides a
basis for the Committee’s concern about infla-
tion because it relates inflation to money
growth, and the Committee sets target ranges
for certain monetary aggregates.
While low inflation countries tend to be low
money growth countries, the relationship is far
from exact. For instance, Japan experienced a
5.5 percent rate of annual inflation during the
period with an average M2 growth rate of over
11 percent, while the U.S. experienced inflation
of 6.1 percent with M2 growth averaging 8.3
percent per annum.” While a few percentage
points on the inflation rate is substantial by U.S.
standards, it is not a lot by world standards.
The good fit in the diagram is obtained by ex-
amining countries with a broad range of infla-
tion experiences, from near zero to more than
80 percent per year. The point is that the U.S.
Federal Reserve, when compared with other cen-
tral banks worldwide, tends to be in the low
money growth—low inflation group -
Another important consideration, emphasized
by Lucas (1980), is that the FOMC’s influence on
inflation appears to be the product of a great
many decisions over a very long time frame.
The evidence presented says nothing about the
relationship between money growth and infla-
tion on a quarter-by-quarter basis.~0Thus, even
when inflation control is taken very seriously,
the FOMC may have considerable room to ma-
neuver on a meeting-by-meeting basis and still
meet its stated long-run inflation objective.
Sustaining Real Output Growth
The nature of the relationship between
monetary policy and real activity is controver-
sial and remains an unresolved issue in macro-
economics.” Nevertheless, FOMC meeting sum-
maries indicate that Committee members believe
an easier policy can mitigate declines in real
output, at least in the short term. In November
1990, for instance, “the members agreed that a
limited degree of easing at this juncture would
provide some insurance against a deep and pro-
longed recession Similarly, in December,
“Members noted that monetary policy had been
eased .--[and thati a limited further move
would provide some added insurance in cush-
ioning the economy against the possibility of a
deepening recession ~a At the same meet-
ing, reference is made to “The stimulus pro-
vided by the recent easing 20 In August
1990, Committee discussion noted that “a tight-
ening move -- -might stall an already weak
economic expansion.”2’ Therefore, while due
note is taken of the theoretical controversy, for
the purposes of this article, the real effects of
monetary policy are simply taken as given.
The Role of Forecasts in Short-
Run Policy Actions
The FOMC’s stated short-run policy objective
necessarily emphasizes the role of forecasting.
The Committee must make an assessment of the
likely direction of the economy in the near term
if it wants to cushion changes in real output
when warranted. In addition, the Committee
also must assess the current and immediate past
position of the economy, since reliable data on
real GNP are not available for several quarters.
As will become clear in the next section, how-
ever, economists have a difficult time forecasting
even a few quarters ahead. By proxying the in-
formation on real GNP available to the Commit-
tee with the Blue Chip Consensus forecast, and
by using only data available at the time of the
meeting, an appreciation of the uncertainty the
Committee faced in 1990 meeting by meeting
will be developed.22
The Blue Chip Consensus is not the only in-
dicator of the perception of economists regar-
ding real activity. The Board staff prepares a
forecast especially for each meeting, and that
projection is probably the most relevant one
“Simple measurement error is one possible reason for such
discrepancies.
“See Lucas (1980) for a method of recovering the close fit
for U.S. quarterly data.
“For a recent survey, see Blanchard (1990).
laoecember Press Release, p. 12.
“February Press Release, p. 12.
“February Press Release, p. 12.
“October Press Release, p. 12.
22The Blue Chip Economic Indicators is a monthly survey of
about 50 mostly private sector economic forecasting firms.
The Blue Chip forecast for a variety of economic variables
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for Committee decision.making.23 Unfortunately, more, in only one case did the Committee’s
~i t i s not declassified until five years after the assessment differ qualitatively from that of the
meeting. Using the Blue Chip forecasts as a Board staff; that case (the October meeting) will
proxy for information available to the Commit- become apparent. Finally, the forecasting difti-
tee is not much of a concern for the analysis to culties discussed in detail below are not a mat-
fr
follow, however, because in every case the icr of decimal points but of qualitative direction;
qualitative description of the Board projection the Blue Chip forecasts will serve to illustrate
given in the Record of Policy Actions is consis- this point.”
tent with the Blue Chip Consensus. Further-
“According to Meltzer (1990), p. 31, “Fed forecasts of GNP
I are as accurate as the forecasts from other models - See also Karamouzis and Lombra (1989) and Meltzer (1987). ‘4See the shaded insert, ‘How Much Uncertainty Exists in
I Forecasts of Quarterly Real GNP?” for a description of the uncertainty surrounding these forecasts.
a ttAV) Ut~I1tMeasuring the Policy Stance
Any summary of FOMC monetary policy ac-
tions requires some measurement of the policy
stance at a point in time. One of the problems
of monetary policymaking is that various mea-
sures can yield conflicting signals, sometimes
making it difficult to discern the thrust of pol-
icy. Consideration in this paper will be given to
four possible measures, or “indicators,” of the
monetary policy stance: the language of the di-
rective, the federal funds rate, the monetary ag-
gregate M2, and total reserves.25 Of these, the
simplest and most straightforward measure, re-
lied on heavily in the following chronology, is to
examine the Record to find out the language of
the directive. The other indicators are based on
a simple analysis that associates “easing” or
“tightening” with movements in measured
variables.
The implementation of monetary policy typical-
ly occurs via intervention in the market for
reserves, which are actively traded among banks.
The interest rate in this market is the federal
funds rate, and the total reserve supply is sub-
ject to control by the Federal Reserve. For a
given downward-sloping demand, the Federal
Reserve can increase (decrease) the federal funds
rate by decreasing (increasing) the supply of
total reserves. A common simple analysis relates
the sum of total reserves and currency (the
monetary base) to measures of money such as
M2 by a proportional factor greater than one
known as the money multiplier.” Generally
speaking, therefore, a decrease in the federal
funds rate, an increase in M2 and an increase
in total reserves can be indications of easier
monetary policy, while movements in the op-
posite directions can be indications of tighter
policy. In practice things are not so clear be-
cause the demand for reserves (and also the
demand for M2) may fluctuate over time, per-
haps swamping the effect of a change in reserves
on the federal funds rate or on M2.27
Nevertheless, because total reserves are sub-
ject to control by the Committee, they constitute
a logical indicator of policy. In addition, because
the Committee set target ranges for both the
federal funds rate and M2 in 1990, they are also
logical indicators of the policy stance.28 Gener-
ally, however, one’s assessment of the policy
stance at a point in time can differ depending
on which indicator is used. As will be shown
below, the indicators can give conflicting
signals, differing not only from the language of
the directive but also from each other.
The data on indicators referenced in the
subsequent chronology are plotted in figures 2
through Ii. The primary reference for the federal
funds rate that will be used is the weekly time
series for 1990 presented in figure 2.29 The
1990 weekly series for M2 is plotted in figure 3;
the annualized weekly growth rates are plotted
in figure 430 The interpretation of M2 is typical-
ly within the context of the tat-get cone, which
is reviewed by the Committee twice yearly and
represents the FOMC’s long-term target. Within
the target cone, however, is some leeway to
alter M2 growth rates meeting by meeting. As
can be seen from figure 4, growth rates of
monetary aggregates tend to be fairly noisy.
The time series for total reserves in 1990 is
given in figure 5. Unfortunately, these data also
tend to be noisy; in addition, the Committee
does not set a target growth cone for total re-
serves. These facts sometimes combine to make
interpretation difficult. Figure 6, however, plots
the annualized intermeeting growth rates of
total reserves, based on the nearest available data
point (since total reserve data are biweekly).
~This list is by no means exhaustive. There are many other
indicators that receive attention from economists, including
various monetary aggregates, reserve components, in-
terest rate spreads, commodity prices and so on.
Reference to these alternative indicators is suppressed in
this article in the interest of streamlining the discussion.
26See Papademos and Modigliani (1990) for a recent
exposition.
“In the Record these fluctuations in demand are sometimes
referred to as short-run technical factors.
22The range for the federal funds rate was set primarily for
consultative purposes; that is, if the actual rate fluctuated
persistently outside the range during an intermeeting
period, the Committee agreed to discuss the situation. The
Committee did not set a range for the federal funds rate at
its November or December meetings, saying it no longer
“served [any] real purpose.” See the December Press
Release, pp. 15-16. Mention of the target ranges for the
federal funds rate and M2 is made only to show that the
Committee gives these indicators some official status.
Total reserves, on the other hand, does not have such a
status.
29For an assessment of this interest rate as an indicator of
monetary policy and a predictor of future real sector activi-
ty, see Bernanke and Blinder (1990).
“For discussions of monetary aggregates and their relation-
ship to real activity, see Christiano and Ljungqvist (1988)







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For all indicator data, vertical lines represent
FOMC meeting dates.
The framework that will be used in this paper
to summarize FOMC decision-making is now
complete. The Committee states its major objec-
tives in every directive, and they are to control
inflation and to maintain sustained growth in
real output. International evidence suggests that
low inflation rates can be achieved by maintain-
ing low rates of money growth. The real output
effects of monetary policy are theoretically less
certain, but summaries of Committee delibera-
tions indicate that members believe temporary
easing can mitigate downturns in economic ac
tivity. Pursuit of this objective requires an assess-
ment of the current and future time path of
real output, but knowing whether the incoming
data signal a change in direction for the economy
is complicated by lags in data releases and er-
rors in even the best economic forecasts. To
summarize FOMC policy actions, some measure
of the monetary policy stance is required. Since
‘1March Press Release, p. 11.





The February meeting was one of two during
1990 when the Committee reviewed its long-
term objectives for growth in the monetary ag-
gregates. Much of the discussion focused on the
growth range for M2.3’ A staff report suggested
that, given the current forecasts for nominal
GNP, the rate of growth of M2 in 1990 was like-
ly to be in the “upper end of the tentative range”
of 3 to 7 percent set the previous July.32 In this
view, the Committee could retain “considerable
leeway” to make “faster progress against infla-
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various measures sometimes suggest differing
interpretations of the thrust of monetary policy,
several indicators will be employed.
CHRONOLOGY OF FOMC
DECISION-MAKING IN 1990
Meeting of February 8-7, 1990
a MAY/JUNE 199140
of the economy by retaining the tentative
range.33
After contemplating the staff report and other
pertinent information, the Committee agreed on
a range of 3 to 7 percent growth for Ma during
the year, as computed from the final quarter of
1989 to the final quarter of 1990. The range set
for M3 was 2.5 to 6.5 percent, down from the
3.5-to-7.5 percent tentative range used in 1989.~~
One interpretation of these growth rates is sug-
gested by the information in figure 1. In par-
ticular, if maintained over a long period of time,
these growth rates are consistent with low aver-
age rates of inflation relative to a world stan-
dard. In this sense the Federal Reserve contin-
ued to maintain its posture for preferring low
inflation relative to other central banks. In fact,
the Committee hoped to “signal a [continued]
determination to move toward the objective of
price stability.””
The Committee also discussed policy for the
period until the next meeting. The outlook for
real GNP at the time of the February meeting is
given in figure 7, which illustrates the beliefs of
private forecasters on February 10. In the figure,
the boxes represent the most recently revised
data available at the time for points in the past,
plus the Blue Chip Consensus forecast at the
time for points in the future. The crosses repre-
sent the evolution of real GNP based on revised
data and the Blue Chip Consensus forecast for
1991 and 1992 available as of April 1991.36
Considering the figure from the perspective
at the time, real GM’ growth appeared to be
near 3 percent in the third quarter of 1989, but
approached zero in the fourth quarter. The
forecast called for increasing rates of growth
throughout 1990. In retrospect, the second and
third quarters of 1989 were actually much
weaker than they appeared at the time.~~ While
the prediction that the economy would rebound
slightly in the first quarter of 1990 appears by
“March Press Release, p. 12,
“According to the Record, the change in the M3 range was
viewed as consistent with an unchanged M2 range for
“technical reasons.” See the March Press Release, p. 13.
~March Press Release, p. 12.
“Blue Chip forecasts are released on the 10th of each
month.
‘7The problem of data revision is acute, and an important
consideration to keep in mind is that the view ofthe data
today is itself subject to revision in the future. See also
Mankiw and Shapiro (1986).
present estimates to have been correct, the pri-
vate sector forecasts of a generally strengthen.
ing economy throughout 1990 turned out to be
erroneous.
The Board staff projections were qualitatively
consistent with the private forecasts at the time
of the February meeting, as they predicted that
“the economy was likely to expand relatively
slowly over the next several quarters.”33 The
FOMC membership generally concurred with
this view, seeing “continuing growth in economic
activity [as] a reasonable expectation for the
year ahead” and “some assurance that the ex-
pansion was no longer weakening and indeed
that a modest acceleration might be under
way
Among the plethora of other information con-
sidered by the FOMC in February, the Record
indicates that, internationally, Japan was experi-
encing strong growth in real GNP and that, while
Germany, Italy and France appeared to be gain-
ing strength, the United Kingdom and Canada
remained sluggish. ‘the trade-weighted value of
the dollar in terms of foreign currencies had
recently fallen, and most of the depreciation
was against the German mark. U.S. civilian un-
employment was unchanged at 5.3 percent.4°
At the conclusion of the meeting, the FOMC
issued a policy directive to “maintain the exist-
ing degree of pressure on reserve positions.”~’
The policy for possible adjustments during the
intermeeting period was to be symmetric, with
no bias toward tightening or easing.~~
Meeting of March 27, 1990
Considering figure 2, policy was indeed steady
in the six weeks following the February meeting,
as the federal funds rate remained unchanged
at about 8.25 percent through late March.
While figure 3 shows that M2 was slightly
above the upper end of the target cone during
“March Press Release, p. 6.
“March Press Release, p. 7. The Committee also discussed
the risk of a downturn.
4cMarch Press Release, pp. 1-4.
41March Press Release, p. 21.
42March Press Release, p. 18. The Committee sometimes
issues asymmetric directives, which augment the basic
directive by stating a direction of bias. In some cases, the
Committee ties the direction of bias to data or other infor-
mation forthcoming during the intermeeting period.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St LOWSFebruary and into March, figure 4 indicates that
most of the weekly growth rates were within a
range consistent with a 3 to 7 percent growth
rate for the year. It does not appear, therefore,
that there was any change in policy according
to an M2 measure of the policy stance during
the period immediately following the February
meeting. Finally, figure 6 also shows little indi-
cation of a change in the thrust of policy, as
reserves continued to grow. All considered, pol-
icy appeared to be steady as the Committee con-
vened in late March.
Figure 7 indicates that the four quarters begin-
ning April 1990, only a week after the March
meeting was held, appear from today’s perspec-
tive to be one of the weakest sequences of
quarters since 1982. Nevertheless, at the time
the FOMC met, there was no indication, accord-
ing
to the Blue Chip Consensus, that the na-
tional economy would be entering a recession
later in the year. The private forecasters’ outlook
43May Press Release, p. 6
44May Press Release, p. 7
41
for real GNP growth changed little between the
February and March meetings.
The Board staff projection was qualitatively
consistent with the Blue Chip forecast, suggest-
ing “the economy was likely to expand at a
somewhat faster pace over the next several
quarters than in the fourth quarter of 1989.”~’
Growth in that quarter was reported to have
been less than 1 percent at an annual rate. The
Committee concurred, as “on balance ... the
members viewed sustained growth in business
activity as a reasonable expectation for the next
several quarters.”44 In addition, the Committee
“expressed a great deal of concern about the ap-
parent lack of improvement in underlying infla-
tion trends.”” Considering the forecast for real
output, in addition to other pertinent informa-
tion, the majority of the Committee voted to
maintain the “current degree of pressure on
reserve positions.”” No direction of intermeeting
bias was specified.
45May Press Release, p. 7.
“May Press Release, p. 13.
I
Figure 7
Private Forecasters’ View of Real Output,
February 1990
Percent change Percent change
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The Board staff warned at the March meeting
that M2 growth might be slow or non-existent
over the spring and early summer, partly for
special technical reasons and partly because of
the general slowing in the rate of nominal GNP
growth. A number of Committee members, com-
menting on the Board staff report, felt a slow-
ing in the rate of M2 growth “would be a wel-
come development,” since it would put M2
growth more squarely within the Committee’s
target range.47
Meeting of May 15, 1990
Figure 2 suggests that policy was steady dur-
ing the period immediately following the March
FOMC meeting, according to a federal funds
rate measure of the policy stance. As the Board
staff report predicted, however, the monetary
aggregate measure tells a different story: M2
growth began to slow in March, moving toward
the midpoint of the Committee’s target cone by
July. Figure 4 shows that annualized weekly ME
growth rates were mostly at or below the 3
percent mark in the weeks between the March
and May meetings. Of course, the March staff
report had predicted a slowing in M2 growth,
and in addition, the data on monetary aggregates
simply tend to be noisy. Figure 6, however,
shows that reserve growth was negative between
the March and May meetings, which might be
construed as a relatively tight policy immediate-
ly following the March meeting. Therefore, as
the Committee convened in May it was not clear
by some measures that policy had been con-
stant during the intermeeting period. By one
measure, policy remained steady; by another,
policy tightened beginning at about the time of
the March meeting.
The outlook for real GNP at the time of the
May meeting, as summarized by the Blue Chip
Consensus forecast, was again virtually un-
changed from February 10. Generally speaking,
the view at the time was much more optimistic
than the view from the present. Private fore-
casters at the time viewed real GNP growth as
being faster for virtually every quarter in 1989,
1990 and 1991 relative to the view today. The
Blue Chip Consensus indicated a virtually fiat
growth rate of 2 percent a quarter through
1990, increasing slightly in 1991.
The Board staff projection concurred with
private forecasts, suggesting “that the economy
was likely to expand at a moderate pace over
the balance of the year.”” In addition, the Com-
mittee “generally agreed that the current infor-
mation on business conditions pointed on balance
to relatively moderate but sustained economic
expansion.”” Considering the outlook for real
GNP as well as other economic information, a
large majority of the Committee supported a
directive that called for unchanged policy with
no bias toward tightness or ease.’°
The Board staff explained in an analysis
prepared for the Committee that M2 growth
was expected to pick up somewhat before the
next meeting, even under a policy of “steady
reserve pressure.”51 Several members com-
mented that “a failure of such growth to pick
up would be a matter of increasing concern”
and might be taken as a reflection, among other
things, of “growing constraints on the availabili-
ty of credit to potential borrowers.”” Generally,
however, the Committee felt it was too early to
reach a definitive conclusion since the observed
moderation might merely be a manifestation of
the natural volatility in monetary growth
rates.”
Meeting of July 2-3, 1990
The July meeting was the second of two dur-
ing the year in which the Committee reviewed
its long-term goals, including an assessment of
the target cone set at the February meeting for
M2 growth. According to the Record, “the Com-
mittee took account of the much slower than
anticipated expansion of M2 - - - in the first half
of the year. - - .“ Some members noted that any
“shortfall from the current ranges should be
kept under careful scrutiny to judge whether
47May Press Release, p. 12.
4eJuly Press Release, p. 6.
49Juiy Press Release, p. 7.
“July Press Release, pp. 10-11.
t1July Press Release, p. ii. This is possible because, while
a component of M2 is related to the monetary base by the
money multiplier, M2 is a broad aggregate with many
other components over which the Federal Reserve has lit-
tle direct influence.
“July Press Release, p. 11.
“July Press Release, p. 11.
“August Press Release, p. 11
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The Board staff forecast for the remainder of
1990 was again in general agreement with the
private forecasts, suggesting “the economy would
expand -- -at around the rate estimated for the
first half of the year.”8 Committee members
concurred with the Board staff and the private
forecasters as they “generally saw sustained but
subdued growth in economic activity as a rea-
sonable expectation for the next several quar-
ters .-.ET]he economy as a whole gave no cur-
rent indications of slipping into recession.”
The forecast of slow but positive growth was
buoyed, according to the Record, by a number
of other factors that the Committee considered
in addition to point predictions of real GNP
growth. Unemployment, for example, remained
at 5.3 percent in May and had been at that level
for more than a year. Industrial production was
up substantially in May, and economic growth
seemed to be satisfactory in the major indus-
trialized nations.’°
Based on the forecasts for real GNP and the
consideration of the most recent data on the
state of the economy, the FOMC unanimously
endorsed an unchanged policy for the seven
week period until the next meeting. ‘Fhe majori-
ty of the Committee also favored a bias toward
“some slight easing” depending on the intermeet-
ing data on ME growth and inflation. In particu-
lar, the majority wanted to ease slightly unless
ME growth picked up appreciably or inflation
began accelerating faster than expected.” Ac-
cording to the Record, “the marked slowing in
monetary growth in the second quarter in par-
ticular suggested the possibility of more
restraint than the Committee intended.”
Figure 9 shows the ME data available at the
time of each FOMC meeting. ‘the crosses repre-
sent the revised data available today, while the
boxes show the time path as it appeared at the
time. At the July meeting, the Committee saw
data suggesting a decline in ME from the level
of the previous meeting. The revised data avail-
able today show no such decline, however, and
indeed generally indicate an increase over the
previous 13 weeks. Data revisions can therefore









Record of the “marked slowing in monetary
growth” when it appears from figures 3 and 4
that money growth was picking up in the weeks
before the July meeting. The data revision prob-
lem for M2 does not seem to have been as acute
for other periods during 1990.
Meeting of August 21, 1990
As it turned out, money growth did not pick
up in the weeks immediately following the July
meeting, and in mid-July “pressures on reserve
positions were eased slightly.” Measuring pol-
icy by the federal funds rate indicates that, ac-
cording to figure 2, policy did ease slightly on
or about July 13, with the rate declining to just
over 8 percent by early August. The effective
weekly federal funds rate later rose, however,
and did not fall below the early August level
until mid-october.
According to figures 3 and 4, the growth path
of ME also seemed to indicate some ease during
the intermeeting period. The annualized weekly
growth rates, which are near zero or negative
in the month immediately following the July
meeting, are greater than 7 percent in the last
three weeks leading up to the August meeting.
Of course, these data are noisy and interpreta-
tion is difficult. Total reserves reached a low
for the year on July 25, reflecting a slight
decline overall during the intermeeting period.
The invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990,
clouded considerably the outlook for the U.S.
economy for the remainder of the year and
through the first half of 1991. The key
economic question was the magnitude and stay-
ing power of the resulting crude oil price in-
creases. According to the Record, at the August
meeting the Committee “. ..focused on both
the state of the economy before the increase in
oil prices and the likely consequences for real
output and inflation of that rise.”°~
A comparison of the available data and the
associated Blue Chip Consensus forecasts for Ju-
ly, August and September, illustrated in figures
8, 10 and 11, respectively, demonstrate the
fluidity of the forecasting situation during this





“August Press Release, pp. 18-19.
“October Press Release, p. 4.
“October Press Release, p. 7.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































“October Press Release, p. 8.
“October Press Release, pp. 1-3.
‘°OctoberPress Release, p. 11.
‘
1
october Press Release, pp. 11-12.
“October Press Release, p. 12.
“October Press Release, pp. 13-14 and p. 16.
74
November Press Release, p. 4.
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FOMC members again concurred with the
staff and private forecasters that “limited growth
in economic activity remained a reasonable ex-
pectation.”68 The Committee recognized that
most of the available data on the economy per-
tained to a period before the Iraqi invasion. The
Record notes that unemployment rose from 5.3
percent to 5.5 percent in July and that domestic
industrial production was flat. Overseas, real
output growth in both Japan and Germany re-
mained robust. In addition, the trade-weighted
value of the dollar had fallen substantially dur-
ing the intermeeting period in terms of other
G-10 currencies.”
In the Committee’s view, the oil price shock
would tend to “weaken economic activity while
also intensifying inflationary pressures.”7°Com-
mittee members tended to see changes in policy
as counterproductive, an easing probably fuel-
ing inflation, a tightening probably stalling a
weak economy!’ Accordingly, the Committee
elected to maintain the current policy stance,
“fostering a stable policy environment.” But sev-
eral members stated that they wanted “to avoid
any paralysis of policy -- -in the weeks ahead.”
Some saw a likely need to ease “at some point,”
weighed against continuing decline in the dollar
j in markets for foreign exchange.” Therefore,
while there were “some differences in views,”
the majority of the Committee membership sup-
ported a bias toward ease in the intermeeting
period.”
Meeting of October 2, 1990
According to the Record, the bias in the direc-
tive was not acted on in the intermeeting period
because inflation was “not abating and the econ- omy [was] continuing to advance, albeit slow-
ly “ Measures of the policy stance in the
weeks immediately following the August meeting, in general, seemed to indicate a steady policy without any bias toward ease. As figure 2 in-
I dicates, federal funds traded at 8-8.25 percent over the period, which represented no change from the previous intermeeting period. Total
reserves grew somewhat during the intermeet-
ing period. Money by an M2 measure displayed,
according to figure 4, considerable volatility in
annualized weekly growth rates in the weeks
following the August meeting, to the point
where an assessment of the intermeeting policy
stance by this measure is quite difficult.
The private forecasts for July, August and
September indicate rapidly deteriorating expec-
tations for real output. Still, no recession was
forecast at the time of the August meeting—or
even three weeks later on September 10—and
the private forecasters appeared to view the
slow growth as temporary, predicting annual-
ized gains in real GM’ of more than 2 percent
by the third and fourth quarters of 1991. The
October meeting of the FOMC occurred eight
days before the Blue Chip Consensus forecast il-
lustrated in figure 12 was officially released.
October, the first month of the fourth quarter,
was the first time this set of forecasters envi-
sioned negative growth on the horizon. By Octo-
ber 10, the Blue Chip Consensus forecast was
actually two consecutive quarters of negative
growth in real GNP—but just barely. A recession
was not definitively predicted by Blue Chip until
November.~’
Figure 13 illustrates the dramatic change in
the outlook for real GNP as forecast by the Blue
Chip Consensus from July 1990 to October 1990.
In the space of only three months, the forecast
changed from one of sluggish but increasing
rates of real growth to near zero and even neg-
ative growth rates. In terms of time for policy
reaction) this change was quite fast. If one ac-
cepts research evidence that monetary actions
affect real activity only with a lag of several
quarters, this rapid deterioration in the ex-
pected performance of real output underscores
the difficulty of making timely short-run adjust-
ments in the stance of policy.
‘The Board staff, acknowledging a great deal
of uncertainty linked to developments in the
Middle East, projected “a mild downturn in eco-





“See the Blue Chip Economic Indicators, October 10 and
November IC, 1990. The October consensus forecast catt-
ed for two consecutive quarters of negative reat GNP
growth, but the second of these quarters was nearly flat.
“November Press Release, p. 6.48
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continued to see strong exports as a mitigating factor, propelled by the projection of continuing growth in several other major industrialized na-
tions, especially Germany and Japan. The staff forecast also relied to some extent on a drop in oil prices during the first half of 1991.”
For the first time in 1990, the FOMC member’-
ship
dissented qualitatively from both private
forecasters and the Board staff in their view of
the likely future path of real output. The Record ‘ reports a sense of the meeting concluding that,
while the Committee felt the risk of negative
real output growth had increased, “overall ceo-
I - nomic activity appeared to he continuing to ex- pand, although at a slow pace. ---[TIhe avail- able data did not point to cumulating weakness
and the onset of a recession.”” Many members
were concerned that surveys of business confi- dence seemed to indicate a declining faith in a
continued expansion, while traditional indicators
continued to suggest sluggish growth.” Some members suggested that inflation was getting
worse even after accounting for the effect of
higher crude oil prices.’0 According to the Record, “A major concern was that the rise in oil prices would become ... firmly entrenched
in the cost structure of the economy -.-and
I F [delay] progress toward price stability.” Never- ~‘ theless, most members felt that “an easing move
was warranted in light of the indications that
there was a significant risk of a much weaker economy.”82
The Committee also expressed concern about
L
an easing in response to the impending budget
deal being crafted by Congress and the White
House. The timing of any move needed to be
considered carefully, as action before any bud-
get accord might create the expectation of more
action after the deal was struck.63 In the discus-
sion, some members suggested that “associating
an easing move too closely with a fiscal policy action might set an undesirable precedent in
terms of producing expectations of similar mon-
etary policy adjustments in the future.”~The
advocates of easing on the Committee agreed
that the “reasons for the easing were not keyed
to the enactment of the new federal budget
alone but more broadly to developments in
credit markets and the economy ‘-‘ The
crux, according to the Record, was simply that
“market participants expected a monetary policy
response to the fiscal policy actions....”
The Committee issued an unusual directive in
response to the concerns about declining out-
put, accelerating inflation and fiscal policy. The
directive called for no change in the degree of
pressure on reserve positions initially, hut as-
sumed “some slight easing would be implement-
ed in the intermeeting period, assuming passage
of a federal budget resolution .-- and the ab-
sence of major unexpected -- -developments.”
Thus, the directive was biased toward ease.
However, the Record indicates that an addi-
tional proviso was added; in particular, the
Committee agreed to ease further if real output
showed further signs of deterioration.” The
Record also notes that “some slight firming”
was not ruled out, should inflation appear to
pick up.”
Meeting of November 13, 1990
During the intermeeting period, policy was in-
itially unchanged. The contingencies in the
directive were exercised late in October, when
“pressures on reserve conditions were eased
slightly.” The Record cites both the “background
of a weakening economy” and “the conclusion
of a budget agreement” as factors influencing
the decision and the timing of the easing.”
Other indicators of the thrust of policy, how-
ever, do not provide evidence of an easing dur-
ing the weeks leading up to the November meet-
ing. ‘The weekly average federal funds rate,
plotted in figure 2, had drifted up to a level
near 8.25 percent by the time of the October
meeting. As the figure shows, federal funds had
been trading near 8.25 percent for most of the
year’, except for the period immediately follow-




“November Press Release, pp. 6-7.
“November Press Release, p. 7.
“November Press Release, p. 10.
‘°NovernberPress Release, pp. 11-12.
‘
1
November Press Release, p. 12.
t2
November Press Release, p. 12.
“November Press Release, pp. 13-14.
‘C
4
November Press Release, p. 14.
“November Press Release, p. 13.
“November Press Release, p. 14.
t7
November Press Release, p. 15.
“November Press Release, p. 15.
“November Press Release, p. 15.
“December Press Release, p. 5.
a MAY/JUNE 1991point just below its early August level during
the intermeeting period. Based on a cursory
look at the level of the federal funds rate,
therefore, the policy stance seemed to be about
the same as it was after the mid-July easing.”
Total reserves fell substantially between the Oc-
tober and November meetings, suggesting a
tight policy instead of an easy one. Finally,
beginning at about the time of the October
meeting, M2 growth nearly slowed to a stand-
still, reaching a level it would not again attain
until the final weeks of 1990. Figure 4 indicates
that most of the annualized weekly growth
rates for the remainder of the year were below
3 percent, and many were negative. By an M2
indicator, then, policy tightened considerably in
the fourth quarter.”
Private forecasters, as surveyed by Blue Chip,
reached a consensus view that the economy
was entering a recession in November, accor-
ding to the forecast illustrated in figure 14. Re-
lative to current projections, however, the fore-
cast remained optimistic about the depth of the
downturn. The Board staff also projected a mild
recession with recovery occurring in the first
half of 1991. The staff assumed a drop in crude
oil prices early in 1991 and export growth
driven by the expansion in foreign industrial-
ized nations. The staff forecast also emphasized
the uncertain environment prodded by the mili-
tary standoff between the U.S. and Iraq on the
Kuwaiti border.”
The FOMC membership saw a relatively mild
recession ahead, thus establishing general quali-
tative agreement with private forecasters and
the Board staff. They also viewed a slow expan-
sion in 1991 as a reasonable expectation.’~Ac-
cordingly, the Committee agreed to some slight
easing immediately and to some bias toward
further easing during the intermeeting period.
Whether the option to ease further was exer-
cised depended in part on “market reactions to
the initial action
The November directive of the FOMC is the
first to indicate a substantial commitment to
ease. At the time of the November meeting, the
economy was in the middle of what appeared to
be the onset of recession. No amount of easing
was likely to change fourth-quarter real output
—industrial production was already in the midst
of dropping 19.8 percent on an annualized basis
in November. Instead, according to the Record,
the Committee viewed the easing as providing
“some insurance against a deep and prolonged
recession....’”
Meeting of December 12-13, 1990
As the Committee convened in mid-December,
the indicators of policy were again sending con-
flicting signals. In the period between the No-
vember and December meetings, the federal
funds rate dropped substantially, suggesting
dramatic easing relative to earlier actions (see
figure 2). As reflected in figure 6, however, the
data on total reserves pointed instead to a fur-
ther tightening of policy, as the previous nega-
tive intermeeting growth rate is followed by a
steeper decline in reserves after the November
meeting. The annualized weekly growth rates of
Ma plotted in figure 4 also do not offer evi-
dence of substantial ease during this period.
Money growth simply continued at a near zero
pace, on average, through to the December
meeting.
Figure 15 reflects the outlook for real GNP at
the time of the FOMC’s December meeting. ‘The
assessment of the private forecasters in the Blue
Chip survey continued to grow more pessimistic
by the month. In fact, one of the striking fea-
tures of the evolution of Blue Chip forecasts in
1990 is that they fairly consistently over-
predicted real output growth.
The Board staff continued to project a mild
recession with a rebound before mid-year 1991.”
Committee members concurred that a short
downturn followed by modest recovery seemed
reasonable, hut they emphasized the risks of a
prolonged downturn. Some Committee members
also recognized, however, the possibility of pro-
“According to the Record, the reason federal funds traded
at 8.25 percent early in the intermeeting period was “more
cautious reserve management policies at some banks and
some carryover of end-of-quarter pressures See the
December Press Release, p. 5.
“By the November meeting, “the recent weakness in
monetary growth was becoming a matter of increasing
concern and was an important consideration for some
members in their support of some easing of reserve condi-










“December Press Release, pp. 6-7
‘4December Press Release, p. 8.
“December Press Release, p. 13.
“December Press Release, p. 12.
“February Press Release, p. 6.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS aU 51
11 Figure 14
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a MAY/JUNE 1991cyclical policy, noting that because of “the lags
involved, there was some risk of overdoing the
easing of policy at some point “ Neverthe-
less, members unanimously supported additional
easing in the directive in order to “provide
some added insurance in cushioning the econ-
omy against the possibility of a deepening reces-
sion and an inadequate rebound.”
In the weeks following the December meeting,
policy indicators suggested that further easing
occurred, if one considers a federal funds rate
measure of the policy stance. ln particular, the
rate dropped to 6.25 percent by the time of the
February 1991 meeting. In addition, the inter-
meeting growth rate of total reserves plotted in
figure 6 seems also to indicate dramatic easing,
as reserves increased nearly 25 percent on an
annualized basis from the December meeting.
There was little evidence of M2 growth in the
weeks immediately following the December
meeting, hut then the aggregate began to show
substantial growth beginning in late January
1991 ‘°° By an M2 measure, policy remained
tight through the first weeks of 1991 before in-
dicating signs of ease. All measures seemed to
indicate ease by the first week of February
1991.
SUMMARY
This article has presented a case study of
FOMC actions during a year in which a reces-
sion began. The Committee states its goals in
each directive, and they are to provide for
stable prices and to promote sustained real out-
put growth. The article has emphasized, within
the context of a chronology of 1990 FOMC pol-
icymaking, some problems of implementing a
policy to meet these stated objectives.
Evidence is presented early in the article
regarding the relation between money growth
rates and inflation rates across countries and
time. An argument is made that over very long
time periods, average inflation tends to reflect
average rates of money growth. lf this evidence
is used as a guide, the Federal Reserve in 1990
recorded stellar success in maintaining gr-owth
rates of money stocks that are much lower than
those achieved by many other central banks.
Coupled with other similar decisions over a long
period, this will continue to place the U.S. in a
small group of countries that will likely con-
tinue to experience, relative to other countries
in the world, very low inflation rates. This arti-
cle has provided, therefore, one interpretation
of the FOMC’s “long-run, anti-inflation strategy”
sometimes cited in the Record.”
The FOMC’s ability to achieve its real output
objective is hampered, however, by the diffi-
culty of forecasting real output changes far
enough ahead to take corrective action. The am’-
tide assessed the information available on the
projected evolution of real output at the meet-
ings by presenting the unrevised data available
at the time along with the most current Blue
Chip Consensus forecast. According to the
Record, the Committee’s views rarely differed
substantially, at least qualitatively, from the
private sector forecast. This, along with evi-
dence in the Record, indicates that a negative
quarter of real output growth was not antici-
pated until October, and a recession forecast
did not come until November, already well into
the first quarter of the downturn.
Another feature of short-run policymaking is
that it requires some measurement of the mone-
tary policy stance. This article has emphasized
how different indicators on some occasions im-
ply different assessments of the thrust of mone-
tary policy. In particular, the total reserves and
M2 indicators suggested that policy was tight in
the fourth quarter, while an interest rate indi-
cator suggested the opposite. By the first quar-
ter of 1991, however, all measures suggested
that the policy stance had shifted toward ease
in response to the onset of recession.
“February Press Release, p. 12.
“February Press Release, p. 12.
icocommittee members showed concern for the flat growth in
M2 at the December meeting. The Record suggests that
while “the behavior of M2 was not fully understood,”
it might be due to caps on credit availability as well as the
weak growth of the economy. See the February Press
Release, p. 13.
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